Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989) Email game is a seminal example. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for all types with multiple rationalizable (ICR) actions, there exist similar types with unique rationalizable action. This paper studies how a wide class of departures from common belief in rationality impact Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity. We weaken ICR to ICR λ , where λ is a sequence whose term λ n is the probability players attach to (n − 1)th-order belief in rationality. We find that Weinstein and Yildiz's discontinuity remains when λ n is above an appropriate threshold for all n, but fails when λ n converges to 0. That is, if players' confidence in mutual rationality persists at high orders, the discontinuity persists, but if confidence vanishes at high orders, the discontinuity vanishes.
Introduction
An extensive literature has taught us that small perturbations to players' beliefs may induce large changes in our strategic predictions. In particular, Rubinstein's email game (detailed below) is a seminal example along these lines: it showed that predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge. That is, if I know that you know that I know, etc., what the payoffs are, but this chain breaks after finitely many levels, some outcomes that would be rationalizable under full common knowledge will be nonrationalizable under this partial knowledge. Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) showed that the discontinuity in the example generalizes: for any type with multiple rationalizable actions, there are types with very similar beliefs that have a unique rationalizable action. We call this the "WY-discontinuity." The notion of "small" changes in beliefs, i.e., the topology on types, is of course highly relevant here: we use here the product topology, as in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) . The significance of this choice is that arbitrary changes in very high-order beliefs are measured as small. Alternatively, recent papers such as Chen et al. (2010) have shown that requiring uniform convergence of belief hierarchies does imply convergence of strategic behavior.
The main result of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) uses the solution concept of interim correlated rationalizability (ICR), which assumes common belief in rationality. In this paper we ask: what happens to the WY-discontinuity if we weaken this assumption? Specifically, we weaken ICR to the more permissive interim correlated λ-rationalizability (ICR λ ) where λ = (λ n ) n∈N is a sequence of probabilities with the interpretation that λ n is the reliability that players attach to nth-order belief in rationality; ICR itself would be the special case that λ = (1 1 ). The answer is twofold: when each element λ n is above a threshold close enough to 1, we find that WY-discontinuity remains (Proposition 5), but when (λ n ) n∈N → 0 as n → ∞ we find that continuity is restored (Proposition 6). That is, when common belief in rationality breaks down almost completely at high orders, the continuity of behavior with respect to perturbations of belief hierarchies is restored. As we discuss in Section 3.2, the ICR λ concept is very flexible; as λ varies it covers concepts close to ICR as well as those much further away (such as rationality without any mutual belief in rationality). This restoration of continuity is important, because, as discussed in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) , the WY-discontinuity has profound implications for the large applied literature on equilibrium refinements. When the discontinuity obtains, all nontrivial refinements are nonrobust to the introduction of incomplete information, or to changes in the assumptions on players' information. Here, we show that some (but not all) relaxations of common knowledge of rationality restore continuity, and hence the possibility of robust refinements.
In addition to our main results in Propositions 5 and 6, we also prove some standard robustness properties of ICR λ . We show that different types that induce the same belief hierarchy induce the same set of ICR λ actions (type-representation invariance, Proposition 1). We also show that, for each fixed λ, ICR λ is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence, i.e., small misspecifications of beliefs do not give rise to unexpected behavior (Proposition 2). Regarding robustness to the weakening of common belief in rationality, we show that when the belief hierarchy is fixed, ICR λ , as a correspondence of λ, is upper-hemicontinuous everywhere and is lower-hemicontinuous at λ = (1 1 1 ), where it coincides with ICR (Proposition 3). This result establishes the full robustness of ICR to a slight weakening of common belief in rationality. Finally, we provide an epistemic foundation of ICR λ to show that it characterizes rationality and common λ-belief in rationality, thus confirming its suitability for the formalization of perturbations in common belief in rationality (Proposition 7). In particular, all these results, besides Propositions 5 and 6, are formulated for generic λ and are therefore applicable to a variety of well-known solution concepts obtained by considering particular subfamilies of λ (e.g., ICR, p-rationalizability or k-level rationalizability).
Rubinstein's Email game
The incomplete information game given by the following payoff matrix is an adaptation of Rubinstein's game: Ex ante, players assign probability 1/2 to each of the values −2/5 and 2/5. Player 1 observes the value of θ and automatically sends a message to Player 2, if θ = 2/5. Each player automatically sends a message back whenever he receives one, and each message is lost, with probability 1/2. When a message is lost, the process automatically stops and each player takes one of the actions Attack or No attack. This game can be modeled by the type space T = {−1 1 3 5 } × {0 2 4 6 }, where the type t i is the total number of messages sent or received by player i (except for type t 1 = −1, who knows that θ = −2/5), and the common prior μ on T × , where μ(θ = −2/5 t 1 = −1 t 2 = 0) = 1/2 and for each integer m ≥ 1, μ(θ = 2/5 t 1 = 2m − 1 t 2 = 2m − 2) = 1/2 2m and μ(θ = 2/5 t 1 = 2m − 1 t 2 = 2m) = 1/2 2m+1 . Here, for k ≥ 1, type k knows that θ = 2/5, knows that the other player knows θ = 2/5, and so on, through k orders. Now, type t 1 = −1 knows that θ = −2/5, and hence, his unique rationalizable action is No attack. Type t 2 = 0 does not know θ but puts probability 2/3 on type t 1 = −1, thus believing that player 1 will play No attack with at least probability 2/3, so that No attack is the only best reply, and hence, the only rationalizable action. Applying this argument inductively for each type k, one concludes that the new incomplete-information game is dominance-solvable and the unique rationalizable action for all types is No attack. Consider Rubinstein's commentary on his example: "It is hard to imagine that [when many messages are sent] a player will not play [according to the Pareto-dominant equilibrium]. The sharp contrast between our intuition and the game-theoretic analysis is what makes this example paradoxical. The example joins a long list of games [. . . ] in which it seems that the source of the discrepancy is rooted in the fact that in our formal analysis we use mathematical induction while human beings do not use mathematical induction when reasoning. Systematic explanation of our intuition [. . . ] is definitely a most intriguing question." Indeed, the goal of this paper is to formalize this intuition. Our main results will show that some weakenings of the inductive reasoning of rationalizability will maintain the unique, counterintuitive selection in the email example that underlies the WY-discontinuity, while others will return us to the more intuitive case of multiple equilibria, from which we may select according to a criterion such as Paretodominance.
When reasoning is the same at every level, even if it assigns less than full confidence to opponents' rationality, the unique selection persists. Indeed, assume that each player i assigns probability p > 2/3 to the other player being rational, assigns probability p to the other player assigning probability p to i being rational, and so on. Again, type t 1 = −1 knows that θ = −2/5, and hence, plays No attack, regardless of her beliefs about the other player's choice. Type t 2 = 0 does not know θ but puts probability 2/3 on type t 1 = −1, thus believing that player 1 will play No attack with at least probability p · 2/3 > 2/5, so that No attack is the only best reply, and hence, the only p-rationalizable action. Similarly, type t 1 = 1 puts probability 2/3 on type t 2 = 0, and thus will play No attack with at least probability p · 2/3 > 2/5, so that, again, No attack is the only best reply, and hence, the only p-rationalizable action, and so on. This is an example of Proposition 5: under appropriate conditions, there will always be a p < 1 large enough that unique selection survives in this way.
The opposite result obtains when players lose almost all confidence in their reasoning at later iterations. Specifically, assume that each player i assigns probability λ 1 to the other player being rational, assigns probability λ 2 to the other player assigning probability λ 1 to i being rational, and so on, where λ k → 0, so that the effect of higher-order restrictions vanishes as we move up in the hierarchy. Now note that even if t 2 = k − 1 is a type that always plays No attack, if λ k < 2/5, we cannot guarantee that No attack is the only best reply for type t 1 = k. Thus, we can always find a sufficiently high number of messages for which the action Attack survives the iterated deletion procedure. This is an example of Proposition 6: when confidence in higher-order reasoning breaks down at high orders, all strictly rationalizable actions will be rationalizable in any perturbation.
Other related literature
This paper scrutinizes the discontinuity in the rationalizable set by altering the solution concept. Specifically, it studies the impact of weakening common belief in rationality on the WY-discontinuity, in the spirit of the quote above from Rubinstein (1989) . Also in this line, previous papers have studied the effects of departure from the standard rationality benchmark by invoking finite depth of reasoning assumptions. Strzalecki (2014) and Heifetz and Kets (2018) extend the notion of type/belief hierarchy so that it incorporates uncertainty and higher-order beliefs about the depth of reasoning. Within this richer framework, Heifetz and Kets (2018) perturb common belief in infinite depth of reasoning (an implicit feature of the standard notion of type in Weinstein and Yildiz 2007) and find that under almost common belief in infinite depth of reasoning, the corresponding notion of ICR does not exhibit the WY-discontinuity. 1 A second research agenda spawned by the finding of discontinuities in rationalizability considered replacing the product topology with alternate notions of proximity. Dekel et al. (2006) introduce the strategic topology that is implicitly defined as the coarsest topology for the space of belief hierarchies under which ICR is upperhemicontinuous and strict ICR is lower-hemicontinuous. Previous papers by Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1997) ensure the robustness of equilibria under incomplete information by proposing topologies whose corresponding notion of perturbation, based on common p-belief, require (unlike perturbations in the product topology) approximations to take similarity of all higher-order beliefs into account. Recent work by Chen et al. (2010 Chen et al. ( , 2017 bridges the gap between the two approaches by providing the exact metric that characterizes the strategic topology and some of its refinements.
Finally, in a third category, an important branch of the literature exploits discontinuities of behavior to construct equilibrium selection arguments (e.g., Carlsson and van Damme 1993) , explain large changes on behavior induces by small changes in economic fundamentals (e.g., Morris and Shin 1998) , and extend the domain in which the WYdiscontinuity holds to dynamic games (Penta 2012 and Chen 2012) and to more general cases of payoff uncertainty (Penta 2013 , Chen et al. 2014a , 2014b .
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review some well-known ideas central to our study. First, in Section 2.1 we describe the game-theoretical framework employed to model interaction. This will consist of games with incomplete information and Bayesian games. Remember that in such games the uncertainty each player faces is twofold: it refers to states of nature that affect preferences (payoff uncertainty) and to the actions the rest of players choose (strategic uncertainty). Payoff uncertainty is dealt with by exogenously setting either types as defined by Harsanyi (1967 Harsanyi ( , 1968a Harsanyi ( , 1968b or belief hierarchies. The construction of the latter, together with that of universal type space, is recalled in Section 2.2. Strategic uncertainty is endogenously resolved by means of a solution concept, namely interim correlated rationalizability. This is presented in Section 2.3, where we also recall the structure theorem of Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) and some of its implications.
Games with incomplete information and Bayesian games
A (static) game with incomplete information consists of a list G = I (A i u i ) i∈I , where: (i) I is a finite set of players, (ii) is a finite set of payoff states, and for each player i we have (iii) a finite set of actions, A i , and (iv) a utility function u i : A × → [−M M], where A = i∈I A i denotes the set of action profiles. 2 For each player i, we refer to a probability measure μ i ∈ (A −i × ), 3 where A −i = j =i A j , as a conjecture, and for each ε ∈ R player i's ε-best-reply correspondence is ε-BR i : (A −i × ) ⇒ A i , given by
For every a i ∈ A i \ {a i }
When ε = 0, the ε-best-reply correspondence boils down to the standard best-reply correspondence and in such case, we simply denote it by BR i . Notice that due to the topological assumptions specified above, the ε-best-reply correspondence is known to be nonempty when ε ≥ 0, and upper-hemicontinuous for all ε ∈ R. 4 We typically represent players' beliefs over by endowing G with a type structure à la Harsanyi (1967) . A type structure is a list T = T i π i i∈I where for each player i we have: (i) a compact and metrizable set of types, T i , and (ii) a continuous belief map π i :
where T −i = j =i T j . We refer to a pair G T as a Bayesian game. The beliefs in type structures are not assumed to arise from a common prior.
Belief hierarchies and universal type space
We follow Brandenburger and Dekel's (1993) formulation of universal type space. For each player i set first X 1 i = and Z 1 i = (X 1 i ), and call each element
= (X n i ) for any n ∈ N. We refer to each τ i n ∈ Z n i as nth-order belief, and to the elements of T 0 i = n∈N Z n i , as belief hierarchies. A belief hierarchy τ i is said to be coherent if higher-order beliefs do not contradict lower order ones, i.e., if marg X n i τ i n+1 = τ i n for any n ∈ N. Let T 1 i denote the set of coherent belief hierarchies and T i , the set of belief hierarchies that exhibit common belief in coherence. 5 Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) show that there exists a homeomorphism ϕ i : T i → (T −i × ), with T −i = j =i T j , such that marg X n i ϕ i (τ i ) = τ i n for any belief hierarchy τ i and any n ∈ N. Obviously, T * = T i ϕ i i∈I is a type structure for game with incomplete information G; we refer to it as the universal type space.
Throughout the above constructions, as is standard, we topologize spaces of beliefs by the weak * topology and product spaces by the product topology, and in this way the space of belief hierarchies inherits a topology. A corresponding metric is also inherited at each step of the recursion: first normalize the metric on the basic space so its diameter is at most 1 (this property will be inherited at each step). Then apply the Prohorov 3 For a given topological space X, we denote by (X) the space of all probability measures on the Borel subsets of X endowed with the weak * topology, so that if X is compact and metrizable, so is (X). In particular, every continuous function under this topology will be measurable under the corresponding Borel σ-algebra, B(X). Topologies for the other spaces are standard: the induced topology for subsets and the product topology for Cartesian products.
4 When necessary, with some abuse of notation we will write ε-BR i (η i ) = ε-BR i (marg A −i × η i ) and
for any compact and metrizable space X and any belief η i ∈ (X × A −i × ).
For any product space X × Y and any subset S ⊆ X × Y , we denote projections on some component of X by Proj X S = {x ∈ X|(x y) ∈ S for some y ∈ Y }. metric to spaces of beliefs, the sup metric to finite products, and the discounted metric,
to infinite product spaces. Thus, the space of belief hierarchies also inherits a metric structure.
Finally, for each type structure T , each type t i induces a belief hierarchy τ i (t i ) = (τ i n (t i )) n∈N as follows: consider first-order belief τ i 1 (t i ) = marg π i (t i ) and then, for any n ∈ N define (n + 1)th-order belief τ i n+1 (t i ) by setting,
for any measurable E n+1 ⊆ T n+1 −i × . The recursive construction being well-defined follows from the fact that, as proved by Brandenburger and Dekel (1993) , every τ i n : T i → Z n i is continuous. In addition, is is easy to see that τ i (T i ) ⊆ T i ; thus, τ i : T i → T i is a well-defined continuous map. Furthermore, if T i has nonredundant types, 6 then it is homeomorphic to τ i (T i ).
Rationalizability and the WY-discontinuity
Once a player's uncertainty with respect to the set of payoff states is formalized by means of some type or belief hierarchy, it becomes pertinent to wonder which subset of actions constitutes a reasonable choice at the interim stage. By "reasonable" we will mean those actions consistent with rationality and common belief in opponents' rationality, or in other words, to those actions that survive iterated deletion of strictly dominated actions. This idea is formalized by interim correlated rationalizability (ICR), introduced by Dekel et al. (2007) . First, let us recall the more general version of ICR embodied by ε-ICR due to Dekel et al. (2006) . Given a Bayesian game G T and a real number ε, player i's set of (interim correlated) ε-rationalizable (ε-ICR) actions for type t i is defined as ε-ICR i (t i ) = n≥0 ε-ICR i n (t i ), where
and recursively, 7
for any n ∈ N. In the case of ε = 0, the definition collapses to Dekel et al.'s (2007) (interim correlated) rationalizability (ICR) and in such case we denote the resulting correspondence simply by ICR i . Dekel et al. (2007) and Battigalli et al. (2011) show that when ε = 0 the specific type structure employed to codify belief hierarchies is immaterial: the set of rationalizable actions corresponding to a type coincides with the set of rationalizable actions corresponding to the belief hierarchy induced by the type. 8 We refer to this property of ICR as type-representation invariance. In addition, it is shown by Dekel et al. (2006) that the correspondence ε-ICR i : T i ⇒ A i is upper-hemicontinuous, and by Dekel et al. (2007) and Battigalli et al. (2011) , that ICR characterizes the behavioral implications of rationality and common belief in rationality. Notice that we permit both positive and negative ε; when ε > 0, the concept is more permissive than standard ICR, and when ε < 0 it is more strict.
In their the study of ICR, Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) find a striking property that generalizes the discontinuity in the Email game from an isolated phenomenon to a general feature of games with incomplete information. To better understand this phenomenon, let us recall the richness condition first.
Definition 1 (Richness condition). We say that a Bayesian game satisfies the richness condition if for all actions a i of any player i, there is a θ such that u(
That is, in games that satisfy the richness condition, no action is commonly known not to be strictly dominant. In this context, the main result by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) tells us that for any type t i and any action a i ∈ ICR i (t i ) there exists some sequence of belief hierarchies (τ n i ) n∈N converging to τ i (t i ) such that ICR i (τ n i ) = {a i } for any n ∈ N. 9 This property, which we refer to as the WY-discontinuity, has important implications for games with incomplete information:
• Nonrobustness of refinements. No nontrivial refinement of ICR is robust in the sense of upper-hemicontinuity on T i . To see why, suppose that S i : T i ⇒ A i is a nontrivial refinement of ICR i . Then there exists some belief hierarchy τ i such that ICR i (τ i ) \ S i (τ i ) contains some action a i . By Weinstein and Yildiz's (2007) result, we know that there exists some sequence (τ n i ) n∈N such that ∅ = S i (τ n i ) ⊆ ICR i (τ n i ) = {a i } for any n ∈ N; hence S i cannot be upper-hemicontinuous. In particular, the fact that equilibrium outcomes refine ICR outcomes implies that equilibrium predictions are not robust: small misspecifications of players' uncertainty by the analyst lead to outcomes overlooked in the original model.
• Generic uniqueness of rationalizability. There exists an open and dense subset of T i such that the set of ICR i actions corresponding to each belief hierarchy in the set is unique. Thus, rationalizability generically (in a particular topological sense) yields a unique prediction.
3. Interim correlated λ-rationalizability
Definition
We now introduce interim correlated λ-rationalizability (ICR λ ), the solution concept that formalizes our relaxation of common belief in rationality. This concept captures the ideas that (A) rationality may not be common belief and (B) players' confidence in the rationality of others may be different at different orders. The sequence λ ∈ [0 1] N signifies that when performing stage n of the elimination process, players have confidence λ n that others have followed the elimination process at previous stages, as captured in the following definition.
Definition 2 (Interim correlated λ-rationalizability). Let G T be a Bayesian game and λ, a sequence of probabilities. Then player i's set of (interim correlated) λ-rationalizable actions for type t i is defined as ICR
where
and recursively, for any n ∈ N, 10
For p ∈ [0 1], we will use λ =p to signify the constant sequence λ n ≡ p. Then ICRp will reflect reasoning that is depth-independent, capturing departures from common belief in rationality in the sense of (A), but not (B) above. Also, we use the usual termwise partial ordering on sequences, so in particular λ ≥p will mean that λ n ≥ p for all n. Our examples all focus on the natural case of decreasing λ, though we do not require this in the definition. This case is natural because it represents depth-dependent reasoning that is less confident at higher orders, hence capturing both (A) and (B) above. We will especially consider the case λ → 0, which represents a near-complete breakdown in confidence of others' reasoning at high orders.
Special cases of ICR λ
Let = [0 1] N represent the set of probability sequences. Certain subsets of give rise to different well-known solutions concepts as special cases of ICR λ :
(i) p-Rationalizability. λ =p, for any p ∈ [0 1]. These sequences follow the idea by Monderer and Samet (1989) of perturbing common belief by employing pbeliefs; this approach was also followed by Hu (2007) in his analysis of robustness to perturbation in common belief in rationality in the context of games with complete information. We sometimes refer to ICRp actions as interim correlated p-rationalizable.
(ii) Rationalizability. The special case λ =1. The standard case of common belief in rationality, i.e., infinite depth of reasoning in which player adhere probability 1 to rationality at every iteration. The case ICR1 reduces to the standard notion of ICR, as defined by Dekel et al. (2007) and discussed above.
(iii) Models with k orders of belief in rationality.
corresponds to the choice of a player who assumes that others are rational for k − 1 orders and makes no further assumptions. 11 (iv) Models with distinct "cognitive bound" and "rationality bound, " Friedenberg et al. (2018) define the following (on p. 3):
-Rationality: Say Ann is rational if she maximizes her expected utility given subjective belief about how Bob plays the game.
-Cognition: Say Ann is cognitive if she has a subjective belief about how Bob plays the game.
From this they further define:
-Reasoning About Rationality: Say that Ann has a rationality bound of level n if she is rational, thinks that Bob is rational, thinks that Bob thinks she is rational, and so on up to the statement that includes the word "rational" n times, but no further.
-Reasoning About Cognition: Say that Ann has a cognitive bound of level m if she is thinking about Bob's strategy choice, if she is thinking about what Bob is thinking about her strategy choice, and so on up to the statement that includes the word "thinking" m times, but no further.
Since rationality is stronger than cognition, we must have n ≤ m. In our model, a rationality bound of n and cognitive bound of m are captured by a λ with λ k = 1 for k ≤ n, λ k ∈ (0 1) for n < k ≤ m, and λ k = 0 for k > m.
A related distinction between rationality and cognitive ability was analyzed in Alaoui and Penta (2016) . In that paper, players choose whether to make the effort of reasoning as much as their cognitive bound allows. This idea is also similar to the framework in Camerer et al. (2004) , which unlike standard level-k reasoning, allows for uncertainty on the level of rationality attached to opponents. Kets (2014) and Heifetz and Kets (2018) generalize the σ-algebras attached to types so that they are able to capture a similar idea, and apply their construction to the study of the WY-discontinuity.
(v) Unlimited depth of reasoning, with uncertainty on opponents' depth. Pick sequence λ satisfying,
Here, we allow λ to be positive at all orders, which would signify that the player has unlimited depth of reasoning and attaches positive probability to all levels of opponents' reasoning. Again, λ n is the probability he attaches to opponents' reasoning to at least depth n. He attaches probability lim k→∞ λ k to his opponents' having unlimited depth of reasoning.
Most of the results of this paper (Propositions 1, 2, and 3, and Proposition 7) apply to every sequence λ, so in particular, also for the families of solution concepts considered above (in particular, Proposition 7 provides an epistemic foundation for all of them within a standard epistemic framework). In Proposition 6, we will focus on a particular class of perturbations:
(vi) Fading higher-order belief in rationality.
The interpretation here is that each player is capable of reasoning to arbitrary levels, but is sufficiently uncertain of his opponents' depth that he loses almost all confidence at higher orders.
Elementary properties
Before continuing to our main results in Section 4, we present some elementary properties of ICR λ . First, we check that ICR λ is type-representation invariant; that is, the specific type structure employed to model a certain belief hierarchy does not affect interim correlated λ-rationalizable predictions.
Proposition 1 (Type-representation invariance). Let G T be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player i, any type t i , and any sequence of probabilities λ,
Proposition 1 can be regarded as a robustness result of ICR λ : different type representations of the same belief hierarchy lead to the same predictions. An additional robustness property of ICR λ is presented in the following proposition, which shows that ICR λ i : T i ⇒ A i is an upper-hemicontinuous correspondence. This means that behavior which is excluded by ICR λ at a certain type will still be excluded at nearby belief hierarchies. This is similar to results shown for ordinary ICR and -ICR in Dekel et al. (2007) .
Proposition 2 (Robustness to higher-order uncertainty about payoffs). Let G T be a Bayesian game. Then, for any n ≥ 0, any player i, and any sequence of probabilities λ, correspondence ICR Remark 1. Notice that, for any n ∈ N, any player i, and any sequence of probabilities λ, the correspondence ICR λ i n : T i ⇒ A i has closed domain and is closed-valued; thus, Proposition 2 and the closed graph theorem imply that Graph(ICR λ −i n ) is closed and, therefore, measurable, justifying Definition 2.
Proposition 1 turns out to be helpful not only in simplifying the definition of ICR λ , but also in the proof of the next result in this section, Proposition 3, which shows that: (i) ICR and ICR λ coincide as perturbations in common belief in rationality vanish (i.e., when λ =1) and, based on the latter, that (ii) ICR is robust to higher-order uncertainty about rationality: 12 behavior is not only upper-hemicontinuous, but indeed, continuous (i.e., also lower-hemicontinuous) when common belief in rationality is perturbed. Furthermore, Proposition 3, when combined with Propositions 1 and 2 above shows that both type-representation invariance and upper-hemicontinuity, as robustness properties of ICR, happen to be themselves robust to perturbations in common belief in rationality.
Proposition 3 (Robustness to higher-order uncertainty about rationality). Let G T be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player i and any type t i , we have that
(ii) The correspondence given by λ → ICR λ i (t i ) is upper-hemicontinuous everywhere and continuous at λ =1
The last result in this section illustrates the connection between λ-rationalizability and ε-rationalizability: for any ε > 0, there exists some strictly positive amount of suspicion of lack of common belief in rationality, represented by λ =p with p < 1, such that for every player and every belief hierarchy, every λ-rationalizable action is also ε-rationalizable.
Proposition 4 (λ-rationalizability and ε-rationalizability). Let G T be a Bayesian game. Then, for any ε > 0, any n ≥ 0, any player i and any type t i , we have that, for every p ≥ 1/(1 + ε/(2M)), ICRp i n (t i ) ⊆ ε-ICR i n (t i ).
Main results
We present now the main results of the paper, which study whether perturbations in higher-order belief in rationality eliminate the failures in continuity of rationalizability discovered by Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) in their structure theorem. To this end, we study the behavior of interim correlated λ-rationalizability for different λ. Our findings 12 A related result by Germano and Zuazo-Garin (2017) shows that their notion of p-rational outcomes (which coincide with the correlated equilibria when p = 1 and otherwise generalize these by assuming common knowledge of mutual p-belief in rationality rather than common knowledge of rationality) are continuous in p, for any p ≤ 1, which, in particular, implies robustness of correlated equilibria to bounded rationality. are twofold. Proposition 5 proves the robustness of the WY-discontinuity for sequences λ with components λ n sufficiently close to 1; even under perturbation in common belief in rationality, if higher-order belief in rationality remains above some threshold p, unique selection arguments à la Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) still work. However, Proposition 6 shows that the discontinuity goes away when λ converges to 0: if higher-order in rationality becomes eventually low enough, unique selection becomes impossible to accomplish. Similar results are found by Heifetz and Kets (2018) , who instead of explicitly relaxing higher-order belief in rationality, introduce a more sophisticated framework that allows for higher-order uncertainty about players' cognitive bounds. The relation between Heifetz and Kets's (2018) work and this paper is examined in Section 4.2, where we also discuss the relevance of our results to global games.
The WY-discontinuity and common belief in rationality
First, we show that the WY-discontinuity persists under perturbations in common belief in rationality that keep higher-order belief in rationality above some high enough threshold. To formalize this insight, we need to recall first the following refinement of ICR due to Chen et al. (2014b) .
Definition 3 (Robust selection, cf. Definition 4 by Chen et al. 2014b) . Let G T be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player i and any type t i we say that action a i can be robustly selected for type t i if there exists some ε > 0 and some sequence (τ n i ) n∈N approaching τ i (t i ) such that ε-ICR i (τ n i ) = {a i } for any n ∈ N. Let RS i (t i ) denote the set of actions that can be robustly selected for type t i .
Obviously, it is possible that a type does not admit a robust selection; however, it follows from Weinstein and Yildiz's (2007) structure theorem and Proposition 5 by Chen et al. (2014b) that if the richness assumption is satisfied then the set of belief hierarchies that admit a robust selection is generic. We can now state our first main result.
Proposition 5 (WY-discontinuity for persistently high λ). Let G T be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then there exists some p < 1 such that for any player i, any type t i , any λ with λ ≥p, and any a i ∈ RS i (t i ), there exists some convergent sequence
Thus, at any type admitting the WY-discontinuity (i.e., with multiple robustly selected actions), the discontinuity persists when the ICR concept is replaced by ICRp, or by ICR λ with λ ≥p. That is, even under this more permissive solution concept, representing bounded rationality, unique selection procedures work and any refinement sharper than robust selection will fail to be robust. Since, as shown by Chen et al. (2014b) , under the richness condition every action which is ε-ICR for some ε < 0 can be robustly selected, the theorem applies to such actions. Thus, for large enough λ as in the proposition, any refinement that makes a selection among strict equilibria will fail to be robust under ICR λ . Indeed, we have the following.
Corollary 1 (Robust selection of strictly rationalizable actions for persistently high λ). Let G T be a Bayesian game, with finite type space, which satisfies the richness condition. Then, for any type t i and any a i ∈ ε-ICR(t i ) for some ε < 0, there exists some p < 1 such that for any λ with λ ≥p, there exists some convergent sequence (τ n i ) n∈N approaching τ i (t i ) such that ICR λ i (τ n i ) = {a i } for all n ∈ N.
We note here that the converse of Proposition 5 fails. The following simple example, where no action can be robustly selected but the conclusion of Proposition 5 holds, is inspired by Section 4 in Chen et al. (2014b) . Consider a case where a player is insensitive to others' actions and has two actions which are tied for best reply. Proposition 3 of Chen et al. (2014b) shows that no robust selection is possible in such a case. The conclusion of our Proposition 5, though, is satisfied for both actions. Since λ now has no impact, the choice of p is irrelevant, and one can simply use any sequence where payoffs are perturbed in a consistent direction to select one of the actions. 13 Results such as Proposition 5 fail if we allow a different weakening of common belief in rationality, where belief in rationality becomes very low at high orders.
Proposition 6 (No WY-discontinuity for vanishing λ). Let G T be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then, for any ε < 0, any player i, any type t i , and any λ with λ n → 0,
If, for instance, each ICR action of type t i is actually a strict best reply for some belief, then the ICR and ε-ICR sets are identical at a type t i for some ε < 0. Proposition 6 then implies that ICR λ i is continuous at t i for any λ with λ n → 0. Notice that Propositions 5 and 6 provide contrasting cases of the impact of higher-order belief in rationality on the WY-discontinuty. On the one hand, Proposition 5 states that the WYdiscontinuity remains under perturbations of that maintain higher-order belief in rationality above a high-enough threshold. On the other hand, Proposition 6 tells us that the WY-discontinuity vanishes under perturbations of a different kind: when the weight attached to higher-order belief in rationality becomes arbitrarily smaller as higher-order beliefs are considered, the unique selection of actions that can be made in the case of common belief in rationality turns out to be impossible. That is, as long as the assumption that higher-order beliefs become eventually negligible for players is introduced, no matter how slowly this diminishing impact of higher-order beliefs takes place, continuity of behavior with respect to perturbations of belief hierarchies is reestablished (even when such perturbations are considered in the sense of the product topology). 14 A special case was mentioned in Section 3.2: when λ n = 0 for all n > k, a version of level-k reasoning. A rough justification for this result, in the level-k case, is that (1) ε-ICR actions (for ε < 0) remain in ICR i k when the first k levels of the hierarchy are close enough to the original type, and (2) the tail of the hierarchy becomes irrelevant when we reason only to level k.
A corollary to Proposition 6 states that the generic uniqueness result of Weinstein and Yildiz (closely related to WY-discontinuity) also fails whenever λ n → 0 and there is any type with multiple ε-rationalizable actions for some ε < 0. Under these conditions, there is an open set of types in which every element admits multiple λ-rationalizable actions.
Corollary 2 (Nonrobustness of generic uniqueness) . Let G T be a Bayesian game. Then, for any player i for which there exist some ε < 0 and some type t i such that |ε-ICR i (t i )| > 1, and for any λ with λ n → 0, the following set is not dense:
Proposition 6 is related to previous work showing that for finite n, ICR n satisfies a form of lower-hemicontinuity. See, for instance, Proposition 2 of Chen et al. (2010) . In the case, mentioned earlier, that λ consists of finitely many 1's followed by 0's, ICR λ is equivalent to ICR n for finite n. Carlsson and van Damme (1993) introduced an argument for selection of "risk-dominant" equilibria, based on a discontinuity of the equilibrium correspondence. Given a complete-information game with multiple equilibria, they construct a family of incomplete-information games based on noisy observations of payoffs in the original game (a "global game"), where the risk-dominant equilibrium is unique even as the noise goes to zero. As discussed in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) , the WY-discontinuity weakens this argument in the sense that, for a larger family of perturbations of the original game, any action may be uniquely rationalizable. Our main results shed some light on these issues in the context of weakened common knowledge of rationality, as represented by ICR λ . Under the conditions in Proposition 5, the selection of risk-dominant equilibria in global games will persist for large enough p, but so will the critique that the WY-discontinuity can lead to any selection. Under the conditions in Proposition 6, unique selection will be impossible for games close enough to the original game, because all actions played in a strict equilibrium, e.g., all actions in a 2 × 2 coordination game, remain rationalizable in small enough perturbations.
Discussion

Implications for global games
Almost common belief in rationality and almost common belief in infinite depth
of reasoning Proposition 6 shows that, under certain arbitrarily small perturbations in common belief in rationality, the WY-discontinuity vanishes; that is, continuity of behavior is restored, even under almost common belief in rationality. Going back to the terminology of Alaoui and Penta (2016) and Friedenberg et al. (2018) , the theorem departs from the standard model in Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) by introducing perturbations in common belief assumptions regarding players' rationality bounds. Strzalecki (2014) and Heifetz and Kets (2018) study the impact on the WY-discontinuity of perturbations in common belief assumptions regarding players' cognitive bound. Specifically, Heifetz and Kets (2018) provides a framework that allows for modeling players' uncertainty about each others' depth of reasoning (i.e., cognitive bound), and show that under almost common belief in infinite depth of reasoning, the WY-discontinuity fails. That is, almost common belief in infinite depth is consistent with robust multiplicity (i.e., absence of generic uniqueness).
Our Proposition 6 sheds light on both rationality bounds and cognitive bounds. As discussed in Section 3.2, for given λ the cognitive bound is sup{n ∈ N|λ n > 0} and the rationality bound is sup{n ∈ N|λ n = 1}. When λ satisfies λ n > 0 for every n, ICR λ represents common belief in infinite depth of reasoning (synonymously, a cognitive bound of ∞, also called unbounded cognition.) Thus, the failure of the WY-discontinuity in Proposition 6, and, in particular, robust multiplicity, are consistent with common belief in unbounded cognition, since the proposition requires only that λ be a sequence converging to 0. Of course, if λ converges to 0, there must exist some m such that λ n < 1 for every n ≥ m, meaning that every players' rationality bound is finite. Within the framework of ICR λ , we see a clear distinction between unbounded cognition, which in many cases allows robust multiplicity, and the much stronger unbounded rationality, which eliminates robust multiplicity and restores the WY-discontinuity.
Alternate definition of ICR λ An anonymous referee proposed an interesting alternate definition of ICR
λ , with the same general motivating ideas. We will call it ICR2 λ and discuss its merits here. To determine ICR2 λ k , one applies elimination steps using the first k values of λ, but reversed from our order. That is, one first runs a round with confidence λ k in remaining actions being played, then with confidence λ k−1 , etc. down to λ 1 , for k total rounds of elimination. To determine ICR2 λ k+1 , then requires an entirely different (k + 1)-step process, starting with λ k+1 . As before, the infinite intersection of the ICR2 λ k
determines ICR2
λ . This may sound like a surprising way to apply the sequence λ k , but it has a nice motivation. The final step, using λ 1 , ensures that all players best-respond to a belief assigning at least λ 1 to rational actions of the other players. The penultimate step, using λ 2 , means that other players's actions are based on assigning probability at least λ 2 to opposing actions, and so on. As pointed out by the referee, this process reflects actions that are consistent with a natural infinite sequence of statements. For Player 1, the first statement would be that Player 1 is rational and believes with probability at least λ 1 that Player 2 is rational. The second is that Player 1 is rational, and believes with probability at least λ 1 that: Player 2 is rational and believes Player 1 is rational with probability at least λ 2 . Our definition involves a much simpler and more intuitive modification to the elimination process. Players analyze the game by first reducing the available actions for each player to actions that are sometimes a best reply. Then they reduce to best replies to the remaining actions, but assuming only λ 1 confidence that the previous step has been applied, and so on. Our concept is motivated by the idea of players who apply the deductive process of successive elimination rules with only partial confidence. Both concepts also have an epistemic foundation, in terms of players' higher-order beliefs about rationality, as distinct from the elimination process. The foundation for ICR2 λ reduces to a single infinite statement, while ours requires an infinite series of independent statements, so this gives ICR2 a rival claim to simplicity.
In two significant special cases that we have mentioned, the case of constant λ and of λ consisting of finitely many 1's followed by zeroes (cases (i)-(iii) in Section 3.2), the two concepts coincide. Indeed, the two concepts are close enough that replacing ICR λ with ICR2 λ has no effect on the two main results, Propositions 5 and 6. The constant case suffices to imply that Proposition 5 is unaffected. Proposition 6 is unaffected because the proof hinges on the fact that λ n → 0 makes the elimination process effectively finite, and this idea applies for either concept.
Epistemic foundation of λ-rationalizability
Finally, we formally analyze the epistemic foundation of λ-rationalizability. The exercise corresponds to the incomplete information version of the case already studied by Hu (2007) , with the addition that beliefs of different order can be given different consideration in the decision making process. Specifically, in Section 5.1 we introduce the epistemic framework needed for our study, which consists of a particular instance of the environment defined by Battigalli et al. (2011) . Next, in Section 5.2 we introduce the notion of common λ-belief, with λ a sequence of probabilities. This concept generalizes the standard notion of common p-belief due to Monderer and Samet (1989) , allowing heterogeneous weights on higher-order beliefs. Common λ-belief serves as the base of our epistemic characterization result in Proposition 7, which generalizes several well-known characterization results in the epistemic game theory literature.
Epistemic framework
By applying Brandenburger and Dekel's (1993) construction to family of basic uncertainty spaces (A −i × ) i∈I , an alternative universal type space, E i ψ i i∈I , is obtained. We refer to each belief hierarchy e i ∈ E i as epistemic hierarchy. This way, following Battigalli et al. (2011) , the epistemic analysis is based on epistemic hierarchies and performed in state space = E × A × , where E = i∈I E i . For each player i, we denote i = E i × A i , and for each state ω, we will consider the following projections:
Thus, each state is a description of players' epistemic hierarchies and actions, and payoff states. The epistemic language is completed as follows.
Rationality and common (p-)belief
We say that player i is rational at state ω whenever her choice at ω is optimal given her first-order beliefs at ω. This event is formally represented by set R i = {ω ∈ |a i (ω) ∈ BR i (e i 1 (ω))}. As usual let R = i∈I R i and R −i = i∈I R i . Note that all of these sets are closed and, therefore, measurable due to BR i being closed-valued and Proj A i , continuous. Assumptions on players' beliefs can be represented by means of p-belief operators, as originally introduced by Monderer and Samet (1989) . For positive probability p, player i's p-belief operator is defined as map E → B p i (E), where for any event E,
is the collection of states in which player i assigns at least probability p to event E; we refer to it as the event that player i p-believes E. The mutual p-belief operator is given by E → B p (E) = i∈I B p i (E) for any event E. When p equals 1, we drop superscripts and refer to 1-belief as simply, belief. Note that it follows from the fact that every ψ i is a homeomorphism that p-belief operators are closed-valued and, therefore, yield measurable sets. Finally, higher-order belief restrictions can be imposed using the common p-belief operator, which is recursively defined as follows: for each player i, let CB p i (E) = n≥0 B p i (B n p (E)), where B 0 p (E) = E, and recursively, B n+1 p (E) = B p (B n p (E)) for any n ≥ 0. We write simply CB i (E) = CB 1 i (E) to represent common belief.
Epistemic hierarchies and belief hierarchies
Unsurprisingly, epistemic hierarchies and belief hierarchies are closely related. As shown by Battigalli et al. (2011) , it is possible to construct, by recursive marginalization, quotient maps q i : E i → T i and q i : (E −i × A −i × ) → (T −i × ) that make the following diagram commutative:
so that consistency between events that are expressible in each domain, the ones corresponding to uncertainty about and uncertainty about A −i × , is guaranteed. Then, for any player i and belief hierarchy τ i , let [q i = τ i ] = {ω ∈ |q i (e i (ω)) = τ i } be the event that player i's belief hierarchy is exactly τ i . Note that [q i = τ i ] is closed due to q i being continuous.
Characterization result
We introduce now the epistemic operator that allows for our characterization result.
Definition 4 (Common λ-belief ). Let E ⊆ be an event, and λ, a sequence of probabilities. Let B λ 0 (E) = E, and set recursively B λ n+1 (E) = i∈I B λ n+1 i (B λ n (E)) for each n ≥ 0. Then, for each player i, CB
(B λ n (E)) is the event that player i exhibits common λ-belief in E.
Thus, common λ-belief generalizes the notion of common p-belief, so that at each iteration, the weight assigned to the corresponding epistemic restriction is not necessarily constant. The epistemic characterization of interim correlated λ-rationalizability exhibits then the expected pattern.
Proposition 7 (Epistemic foundation of ICR λ ). Let G T be a Bayesian game and λ, a sequence of probabilities. Then λ-rationalizability characterizes rationality and common λ-belief in rationality; that is, for any player i and any type t i it holds that The theoretical relevance of Proposition 7 lies in two features. First, as depicted in Figure 1 , it shows that rationalizability is robust to a wide range of perturbations of common belief in rationality: not only perturbations à la p-belief, but also to the more general ones captured by nonconstant λ parameters. This follows from the facts that: (i) interim correlated λ-rationalizability represents rational choice under departures from the standard rational benchmark by relaxing higher-order belief in rationality not necessarily weighting different order belief in an homogeneous way (Proposition 7) and (ii) interim correlated λ-rationalizability is upper-hemicontinuous on λ and indeed, continuous when λ =1 (Proposition 3). Second, since the result holds for arbitrary sequence λ, the epistemic foundation result covers the cases of particular λ sequences characterizing the different solution concepts reviewed in Section 2.3. This is already known in the case of standard solution concepts such as ICR (see Theorem 1 by Battigalli et al. 2011 , which corresponds to the λ =1 case) or p-rationalizability (see Proposition 1 by Hu (2007) , which corresponds to the case of λ =p and τ i exhibiting common belief in some game). The fact that solution concepts based on complex formal departures such as finite depth of reasoning models can be formalized and given epistemic formulation by means of already well-known tools reinforces the strength of the standard and classic game-theoretical approach.
Appendix A: Proofs: Properties of ICR λ
A.1 Elementary properties
For convenience, we begin with the proof of Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 (Robustness to higher-order uncertainty about payoffs). Let G T be a Bayesian game. Then, for any n ≥ 0, any player i, and any sequence of probabilities λ, correspondence ICR Proof. We proceed by induction. The initial step (n = 0) is immediate: τ i → ICR λ i 0 (τ i ) = A i is trivially upper-hemicontinuous for any i ∈ I and λ ∈ . For the inductive step, suppose the claim holds for n ≥ 0. Then, to check the (n + 1) case, fix i ∈ I and λ ∈ , and pick a convergent sequence (τ k i ) k∈N with limit τ i and a i ∈ A i such that a i ∈ ICR λ i n+1 (τ k i ) for any k ∈ N. Then we know that for any k ∈ N there is some
i ) m∈N be a convergent subsequence of (η k i ) k∈N and let η i denote its limit. Since marg T −i × is continuous, η i ∈ C λ i 0 (τ i ). Now, notice that we know by the induction hypothesis that ICR An immediate corollary of this result is Remark 1, simply because closed sets are measurable. Remark 1 greatly simplifies the proof of the following lemma, providing an alternate characterization of ICR λ , which is used in the proofs of Propositions 1 and 3.
Lemma 1. Let G be a game with incomplete information and λ, sequence of probabilities, and let λ 0 = 1. Then, for n ∈ N, any player i and any belief hierarchy τ i it holds that:
There exists a measurable σ −i :
We proceed by induction on n.
Initial step (n = 1). For the right-hand inclusion, pick a i ∈ ICR λ i 1 (τ i ) and
for any measurable E ⊆ T −i × , it follows immediately from the disintegration theorem that there exists a map σ −i :
is measurable. Hence, σ −i is measurable, too. 16 15 See Theorem 5.3.1 in Ambrosio et al. (2006, p. 121) . We are working with compact and metrizable spaces; thus, in particular, all of them are Polish, and hence, Radon.
16 Remember that we know from Lemma 4.5 by Heifetz and Samet (1998) that the Borel σ-algebra in corresponding to A −i is generated by family
Then, since ICR λ −i 0 (τ −i ) = A −i for and τ −i ∈ T −i , σ −i obviously satisfies conditions (i) and (ii) in the statement of the lemma. For the left-hand inclusion, pick a i ∈ A i and measurable σ −i : T −i × → (A −i ) satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) above. Then define measure η i ∈ (T −i × A −i × ) as follows:
for any measurable E ⊆ T −i × A −i × . 17 We now make the following two claims:
To see this, pick measurable E ⊆ T −i × and develop
• a i ∈ BR i (η i ). To see this, first define for each
Then the fact that σ −i satisfies property (ii) above proves the claim.
In consequence, a i ∈ ICR λ i 1 (τ i ).
17 A similar argument to the one in the previous footnote proves that if σ −i is measurable, then so is σ E −i
for measurable set E. Since every set Proj A −i (E ∩ {(τ −i a −i θ)}) is measurable, we conclude that η i is a well-defined measure.
Inductive step. Suppose that n ≥ 1 is such that the claim holds. Let us check the (n + 1) case. For the right-hand inclusion, pick a i ∈ ICR λ i n+1 (τ i ) and η i ∈ C λ i n (τ i ) such that a i ∈ BR i (η i ), and family (M k ) n k=1 of measurable sets such that M k ⊆ Graph(ICR
for any measurable E ⊆ T −i × , we know again from the disintegration theorem that there exists a map σ −i : T −i × → (A −i ) that satisfies properties (a), (b), and (c) in the paragraph above (in particular, we saw that such σ −i is measurable). Condition (ii) in the statement of the lemma is trivially satisfied. To see (i), simply note that for any k = 1 n,
For the left-hand inclusion, pick a i ∈ A i and measurable map σ −i : T −i × → (A −i ) satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) for the (n + 1)th version of the statement of the lemma. Then define measure η i ∈ (T −i × A −i × ) as follows:
for any measurable E ⊆ T −i × A −i × . We claim now that the following three hold:
• η i ∈ C λ i n (τ i ). Note that we know from Proposition 2 that
• a i ∈ BR i (η i ). To see this, first, define, for each
The fact that σ −i satisfies property (ii) above proves the claim.
This way we conclude that a i ∈ ICR λ i n+1 (τ i ).
We now apply Lemma 1 to the proofs of the two remaining propositions of Section 3.3.
Proof. We will prove the slightly more general claim: for any player i, any type t i , any sequence of probabilities λ, and any nonnegative integer n, it holds that ICR λ T i n (t i ) = ICR λ i n (τ i (t i )). Let us proceed by induction on n. The initial case (n = 0) holds trivially. For the inductive step, suppose that n ≥ 0 is such that the claim holds for any k = 0 n, and fix i ∈ I, t i ∈ T i , and λ ∈ . For the right inclusion, pick a i ∈ ICR λ T i n+1 (t i ) and μ i ∈ C λ T i n (t i ) such that a i ∈ BR i (μ i ), and for each
Thus, it follows from (i) that a i ∈ BR i (η i (μ i )), and from (ii) that η i (μ i ) ∈ C λ i 0 (τ i (t i )). Now, fix k = 0 n and note that we know, due to the induction hypothesis that 20
Thus, we conclude that η i (μ i ) ∈ C λ i n (τ i (t i )). For the left inclusion, we make use of Lemma 1. Pick a i ∈ ICR λ i n+1 (τ i (t i )) and measurable σ −i : T −i × → (A −i ) satisfying conditions (i) and (ii) in the statement of the lemma. Since map f −i :
for any measurable E ⊆ T −i × A −i × . Then we have that:
. To see this, pick measurable E ⊆ T −i × and develop
• a i ∈ BR i (μ i ). Note first that
Then, for any a i ∈ A i ,
Then the fact that σ −i satisfies property (ii) proves the claim.
Thus, we conclude that a i ∈ ICR λ T i n+1 (t i ).
(ii) The correspondence given by λ → ICR λ i (t i ) is upper-hemicontinuous everywhere and continuous at λ =1 Proof. Since it follows immediately from Lemma 1 that for any n ∈ N, any i ∈ I and any τ i ∈ T i , ICR i n (τ i ) = ICR 1 i n (τ i ), we focus on the claims concerning continuity. We prove them separately.
Upper-hemicontinuity. We prove first the following claim: for any i ∈ I, any τ i ∈ T i , and any n ≥ 0, correspondence λ → ICR λ i n (τ i ) is upper-hemicontinuous. We proceed by induction on n. The initial step (n = 0) holds trivially. For the inductive step, suppose that n ≥ 0 is such that the claim holds for any k = 0 n. In particular, note that each ICR
is compact-valued, and hence, upper-hemicontinuity implies that n≥0 ICR
i n+1 (τ i ) for any m ∈ N, and denote by (λ a i ) the limit of the sequence. We need to check that a i ∈ ICR . Since is compact-valued and upper-hemicontinuous, then a −i ∈ (λ) for any (λ n ) n∈N converging to λ such that a −i ∈ (λ n ) for any n ∈ N. Thus, n∈N (λ n ) ⊆ (λ).
thus, we know from the upper-hemicontinuity of BR i that a i ∈ BR i (η i ). Since marg T −i × is continuous, we also know that marg T −i × η i = ϕ i (τ i ).
It only remains to be checked that
Fix k = 0 n and notice that η It follows from the above that for any i ∈ I, any τ i ∈ T i , and any n ≥ 0, Graph(ICR (·) i n (τ i )) is closed, and thus, that so is ICR
It follows from (i) and (ii) that
i n (τ i ))) for any λ ∈ . Thus, ICR (·) i n (τ i ) is a compact-valued correspondence, and hence, by Theorem 17.25 in Aliprantis and Border (1999) , we conclude that ICR
i n (τ i ) is upper-hemicontinuous. Continuity at λ = 1. Fix i ∈ I, and τ i ∈ T i . It suffices to check lower-hemicontinuity at λ = 1; that is, we need to show (see Aliprantis and Border 1999, Definition 17.2) that for any open subset U ⊆ A i such that ICR λ i (τ i ) ∩ U = ∅, there exists a neighborhood 22 By A k m , we denote the closure of A k m ; note that we know from Proposition 2 that ICR λm −i k has a closed graph.
This follows immediately from the fact that, since λ n ≥ λ n for any n ∈ N, then ICR
Proof. Fix ε > 0, i ∈ I, τ i ∈ T i and p ≥ 1/(1 + ε/(2M)). We proceed by induction on n. The initial case (n = 0) holds trivially. Suppose that the claim is true for n = k; let us verify that then it also holds for n = k + 1. Fix a i ∈ ICRp i k+1 (τ i ) and conjecture μ i ∈ Cp i k (τ i ) for which a i is a best-reply. Now:
It follows from the induction hypothesis that in any caseμ i ∈ ε-C i k (τ i ). Since a i ∈ BR i (μ i ) it follows that if (i) then, in particular, a i ∈ ε-BR i (μ i ), and thus, that a i ∈ ε-ICR i k+1 (τ i ). If (ii) it follows from a i ∈ BR i (μ i ) that for any a i ∈ A i \ {a i },
and thus, that
we conclude that a i ∈ ε-ICR i k+1 (τ i ) in this case, too.
A.2 Epistemic characterization
Proposition 7 (Epistemic foundation of ICR λ ). Let G T be a Bayesian game and λ, a sequence of probabilities. Then λ-rationalizability characterizes rationality and common λ-belief in rationality; that is, for any player i and any type t i it holds that
Proof. Fix sequence of probabilities λ. Now, first, for any i ∈ I and any n ≥ 1 define auxiliary correspondence i n : Graph(ICR λ i n ) ⇒ i as follows:
Note that for any i ∈ I and n ∈ N, correspondence i n−1 has closed graph: pick convergent sequence (τ m i a m i e m i a m i ) m∈N ⊆ Graph( i n−1 ) with limit (τ i a i e i a i ). Since q i (e m i ) = τ m i for any m ∈ N and q i is continuous, we know that e i ∈ q 
). This way, we conclude that (τ i a i e i a i ) ∈ Graph( i n−1 ). Now, for any i ∈ I denote B λ 0 i (R) = . Let us prove that for any n ≥ 0 we have that,
We proceed by induction.
Initial step. Fix i ∈ I. For the left inclusion, pick ω ∈ R i and set (τ i a i ) = (q i (e i (ω)) a i (ω)). Define now η i ∈ (T −i × A −i × ) as follows:
Since q −i is a homeomorphism, η i is well-defined, and obviously, it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) marg T −i × η i = q i (τ i ) and (ii) marg A −i × η i = e i 1 (ω). Thus, we have, first, that η i ∈ C λ i 0 (τ i ), and, second, since ω ∈ R i , that a i ∈ BR i (η i ). In consequence, (τ i a i ) ∈ Graph(ICR λ i 1 ). For the right inclusion, define first correspondence i 0 : T i × A i ⇒ i as follows: (τ i a i ) → q −1 i (τ i ) × {a i }. Obviously, i 0 is nonempty and has a closed graph. Thus, it is also weakly measurable and then we know from the Kuratowski-Ryll Nardzewski selection theorem that it admits a measurable selector φ i 0 . Let φ −i 0 = (φ j 0 ) j =i . Next, pick (τ i a i ) ∈ T i × A i such that a i ∈ ICR λ i 1 (τ i ), and η i ∈ C λ i 0 (τ i ) such that a i ∈ BR i (η i ), and define belief ψ i (η i ) ∈ (E −i × A −i × ) as follows:
Since φ −i 0 is measurable and its domain is T −i × A −i , ψ i (η i ) is well-defined. Set e i = ψ −1 i (ψ i (η i )). Then we have that: (i) marg T −i × ψ i (e i ) = marg T −i × η i and (ii) e i 1 = marg A −i × η i . Thus, it follows that q i (e i ) = τ i and a i ∈ BR i (e i 1 ), and, therefore, that (e i a i ) ∈ Proj E i ×A i (R i ). Notice that, in particular, the proof of the right inclusion implies that i 1 is nonempty.
Inductive step. Suppose that n ≥ 0 is such that for any k = 0 n the claim holds and i k+1 is nonempty for any i ∈ I. Fix i ∈ I. For the left inclusion, pick ω ∈ R i ∩ B λ n+1 i (R) and let (τ i a i ) = (q i (e i (ω)) a i (ω)). Define belief η i ∈ (T −i × A −i × ) as follows:
E → η i [E] = ψ i e i (ω) (e −i a −i θ) ∈ E −i × A −i × | q −i (e −i ) a −i θ ∈ E Since q −i is a homeomorphism, η i is well-defined, and clearly, it satisfies the following two conditions: (i) marg T −i × η i = q i (τ i ) and (ii) marg A −i × η i = e i 1 (ω). Thus, obviously, we have, first, that η i ∈ C λ i 0 (τ i ), and second, since ω ∈ R i , that a i ∈ BR i (η i ). Finally, notice that, since ω ∈ B λ n+1 i (R), for any k = 1 n + 1 it holds that η i Graph ICR , and η i ∈ C λ i n+1 (τ i ) such that a i ∈ BR i (η i ). We know from the induction hypothesis that j n+1 is nonempty for any j = i. Thus, since every j n+1 has closed graph, and hence, is weakly measurable, there exists a measurable map φ −i n+1 = (φ j n+1 ) j =i where for each j = i map φ j n+1 is a measurable selector of j n+1 . Next, let us introduce the following notational convention: let Z −i k = Graph(ICR for any k = 0 n. Since every φ −i k+1 is measurable, ψ i (η i ) is well-defined. Set e i = ψ −1 i (ψ i (η i )) and ω i = (e i a i ). Then we have that: (i) marg T −i × ψ i (e i ) = marg T −i × η i and (ii) e i 1 = marg A −i × η i . Thus, it follows that q i (e i ) = τ i and a i ∈ BR i (e i 1 ). Now, notice that for any k = 0 n we have that Thus, we conclude that ω ∈ R i ∩ B λ n+1 i (R) ∩ [q i = τ i ] and, therefore, that there exists some (e i a i ) ∈ Proj E i ×A i (R i ∩ B λ n+1 i (R)) such that q i (e i ) = τ i . Finally, notice that, in particular, the proof of the right inclusion implies that for any i ∈ I correspondence i n+2 is nonempty. Now, in order to complete the proof, fix i ∈ I and τ i ∈ T i , and notice that for any n ≥ 0, 
B.1 Robustness of the WY-discontinuity
Proposition 5 (WY-discontinuity for persistently high λ). Let G T be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then there exists some p < 1 such that for any player i, any type t i , any λ with λ ≥p, and any a i ∈ RS i (t i ), there exists some convergent sequence (τ n i ) n∈N approaching τ i (t i ) such that ICR λ i (τ n i ) = {a i } for all n ∈ N.
Proof. Fix any t i and use τ i as an abbreviation for τ i (t i ). Since a i is robustly selected for t i , we know that there exists some ε > 0 and some sequence (τ n i ) n∈N converging to τ i such that a i is uniquely ε-rationalizable for τ n i for every n ∈ N. Then it follows from Proposition 4 and nonemptiness ofp-rationalizability that for any p ≥ 1/(1 + ε/(2M)), a i is uniquelyp-rationalizable for τ n i for every n ∈ N. Then the result follows from the fact that ICR λ is clearly monotone decreasing, i.e., for λ ≥p and every a i , ICR λ i (a i ) ⊆ ICRp i (a i ).
B.2 Nonrobustness of the WY-discontinuity
Proposition 6 (No WY-discontinuity for vanishing λ). Let G T be a Bayesian game with finite type space. Then, for any ε < 0, any player i, any type t i , and any λ with λ n → 0, there exists a neighborhood U of τ i (t i ) such that ε-ICR i (t i ) ⊆ ICR
